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In the sixth month of Barak Obama's Presidency twenty two former politicians and intellectuals 
from Central and Eastern Europe addressed an open letter to the new Administration. The signa-
tories are worried of emerging trends of 'pragmatism' and 'realism' in Washington's foreign po-
licy. It is rather symptomatic that no worries were expressed in these circles when George W. Bush 
was in the White House and American prestige was falling around the world. 
The letter is a direct result of President Obama's visit to Moscow and small and cautious steps 
towards what has become fashionable to call 'resetting' the relations between Washington and 
Moscow (though 'upgrading', not going back to either Soviet or Yeltsin years, is what is really 
needed). The authors of the open letter 'want to ensure that too narrow an understanding of 
Western interest does not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia'. They don't have any doubts 
that perhaps it may be their own perception of Western (as well as their peoples') interests that 
may be narrow and even parochial. They worry that in their countries a new generation of lea-
ders may emerge that don't share old memories and that would follow more 'realistic' policies. 
But isn't this exactly what is needed? New leaders (be it in Russia, in Eastern Europe or in 
America), not burdened by the stereotypes of the past era, would be better equipped to tackle 21s t 
century challenges. Even the revolutionaries of the 1980s such as Mikhail Gorbachev, Lech 
Walesa or Vaclav Havel (the last two are signatories of the letter) - notwithstanding all their 
great contribution to the advancement of freedom in their own countries as well as in the world 
as a whole - can hardly be leaders in a 21s t century world. It is only in military dictatorships that 
those who carry out coups also keep ruling long after coming to power (if not overthrown by 
another coup). Usually it is that 'la revolution devore ses enfants' though not necessarily in the 
literal sense as in France of 1789 or in Russia of 1917. 
The signatories who write that they are 'Atlanticist voices within NATO and the EU' seem to 
speak mainly on behalf of what the former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called 'the new 
Europe' in contradistinction to the 'old', i.e. Western, Europe. However, what may have been 
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praiseworthy and new from the point of view of Messrs Bush, Cheney or Rumsfeld was not 
necessarily true even then. Today, at least with hindsight, we see that in many cases it was 'the 
old Europe' that was more prescient (e.g., on WMD and the war in Iraq generally) than 'the new 
Europe', which thankfully yet blindly always followed Washington's lead. 
As the world is becoming more and more globalised, many Eastern Europeans are more prone 
than most Westerners to see the world as Euro- or rather as Atlanto-centric. During the Soviet 
domination of this part of Europe these peoples indeed rightly saw the West, and especially the 
United States, as the only force that could help them become part of a prosperous and free world 
(in Estonia, for example, it was the dream of 'the white ship' coming to free us). Therefore their 
Atlanto-centrism may be explicable but this doesn't mean that it is a right approach, or that it 
reflects new realities. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin wall a vision of the world as 
divided into 'us', i.e. Euro-Atlantists and 'them', i.e. the rest including Islamic countries, China 
and the Eastern Europeans closest neighbour and former hegemonic power - Russia, is a twen-
tieth century image of the world that is based on an ideological and confrontational vision of 
international relations. 
Eastern European nations have joined Western Europe at a time when more and more people in 
the West understand that the world is not anymore Euro- or even Atlanto-centric. Contrary to the 
Bush Administration's simplistic vision of the world - 'those who are not with us are against us' 
(or even: those who are not like us are - at least potentially - against us) the current American 
leadership seems to understand that the world is much more complicated. 
Today, we see that many in those countries that have only recently joined the Western club of 
nations are much more ideologically minded than the 'old' West, or for that matter even the for-
mer ideological, par definition, powers Russia and China. In that respect they are more akin to 
the neocons of the George W Bush era. The signatories of the letter more than once warn against 
'realism' and 'pragmatism' in the foreign policy of the West, i.e. they emphasise the need of 
ideologically based foreign policy. 
Although we, Estonians, are generally quite pragmatic people, it seems to me there is too much 
ideology in our society. The Soviet Union, from which we 18 years ago broke free, was an 
ideological empire. The rejection of the Soviet ideology may take two main forms: jumping into 
the folds of an opposite ideology, i.e. from the leftist to the rightist, from a totalitarian to a ultra-
libertarian, or becoming critical of any ideology. I belong to the latter category and already in the 
it 
summer of 1991, before 20 August when Estonia regained its independence, when Juri Luik 
(then the Head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry and later Minister) and I 
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worked on foreign policy concept of a future independent Estonia, he favoured an ideological 
concept while I was for a pragmatic approach. Today I am even more convinced that not only 
foreign policy but politics generally as well as economics and other social spheres are in need of 
pragmatic approaches. This does not mean that one has to reject ideas, even radical, bold and big 
ideas. There are times for them too. While ideas are usually forward looking, ideology is tied to 
the past. Neither does pragmatism necessitate one to give up one's values. The Economist spea-
king of Margaret Thatcher, who is usually thought of as a free market ideologue par excellance, 
writes that 'She was much more of a pragmatist than is often credited; it was when she ditched 
that approach to pursue the Platonic ideal of Thatcherism that she was undone'.1 7 3 It was prag-
matist Thatcher who succeeded in turning around ailing British economy and it was ideological 
Thatcherite Thatcher who failed as politician. To put it otherwise, if there is a conflict between 
ideology and facts, for an ideologue these are the facts that have to give way. 
There is a dangerous tendency, especially in some former Soviet bloc states, to support any en-
tity, any action, to endorse any statement that is seen as directed against Russia. The clearest 
example was their reaction to the war between Georgia and Russia that started almost exactly a 
year ago. In order to better illustrate this attitude of political elites of some Eastern European 
states to the August 2008 military conflict in the Caucasus let us compare it with some reactions 
to another conflict in a different part of the world and at a different period. 
In the 1980s Soviet Union, there lived and worked a man called Marklen Ivanovich Lazarev. In 
the spring of 1982, at the beginning of the Falklands war between Argentina and Great Britain, 
the then Deputy Director of the Institute for Latin America Studies and Professor of international 
law in Moscow wrote in one of the leading Soviet newspapers that although it was obvious that 
Argentina had used military force first, it should be nevertheless absolutely clear for every 
person of good will who was the aggressor, i.e. it axiomatically should have been the 'perfidious 
Albion' - an 'imperialist ally' of the 'hegemonic United States'. This is the best example of an 
attitude driven by ideology. Such an approach was widespread in all communist countries. In 
such cases, one's perceptions and actions are guided not by facts but exclusively by preconcei-
ved ideas, concepts and stereotypes, i.e. by ideology. In the case of Marklen Ivanovich Lazarev 
this was the communist ideology that was instinctively anti-American and anti-Western. In the 
case of the reaction of political elites in some Eastern European countries to the last August war 
between Georgia and Russia it was the fear and hatred of Russia that served as a distorting lens 
through which they saw all the developments in the Caucasus. No doubt, there are many negative 
173' The Economist, 22 August 2009, p. 27. 
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facts and tendencies in the external and, in my opinion, even more so in internal politics of 
Russia, some of which may justifiably worry and concern other peoples and governments as 
well. However, this does not mean that Russia was the main culprit of the last year's military 
conflict between Georgia and Russia. Today it is has become more and more widely recognised 
in the West that it was Georgian President Saakashvili that initiated the conflict.1 7 4 
Such a reaction was due to a combination of what I would call three d's: dislike, dread and for 
some even disappointment. Dislike, because Russia, or the Soviet Union for that matter, had in 
the past indeed all too often behaved like a big bully (though she is not the only one, nor even the 
first in this category); dread because, as we saw in the case of Russia's forceful and disproportio-
nate response to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia in August 2008, suddenly this 'colossus 
with clay feet' or 'Upper Volta with missiles', as some may have thought of her, was, once 
again, like the Phoenix, rising from the ashes; disappointment since notwithstanding 'the 1990s 
promises' she still refuses to become a 'normal' country and toe the line drawn in Washington. 
Fear and hatred are the worst guides in politics and ideological approaches that subordinate facts 
to preconceived ideas are recipes for disaster. President (then still Senator) Obama wrote that 
while 'values are faithfully applied to facts before us, ideology overrides whatever facts call 
1 
theory into question'. We m Estonia, and I believe people, in other Baltic countries as well as 
in Eastern and Central Europe live in the post-Soviet space. In geographical terms this is an 
incontestable fact. We were occupied by the Soviet Union or like Poland, Hungary and other 
Eastern and Central European nations were made satellite states of the USSR. However, in my 
opinion, there is also too much post-Soviet mentality in some of our societies. Using the prover-
bial fox and hedgehog analogy176, we concentrate on one big thing - our past grievances and we 
see today's world as well as future tendencies coloured by this spectrum. Here we were closely 
following neocons in the Bush Administration. 
m See, e.g., D. Bandow, 'Tbilisi's Baggage', The National Interest Online, 31 December,.2008; The German 
Spiegel wrote as early as in November 2008: 'One thing was already clear to the officers at NATO headquarters 
in Brussels: They thought that the Georgians had started the conflict and that their actions were more calculated 
than pure self-defense or a response to Russian provocation. In fact, the NATO officers believed that the Geor-
gian attack was a calculated offensive against South Ossetian positions to create the facts on the ground, and they 
coolly treated the exchanges of fire in the preceding days as minor events. Even more clearly, NATO officials 
believed, looking back, that by no means could these skirmishes be seen as justification for Georgian war 
preparations' ('Did Saakashvili Lie? The West Begins to Doubt Georgian Leader', Spiegel International Online, 
15 November, 2008). 
1 7 5 , B. Obama, The Audacity of Hope. Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream, Canongate, 2006, p. 59. 
1 7 6 , The dilemma of the fox, who knows many things, and the hedgehog, who knows one big thing, raised by ancient 
Greek poet Archilochus and made famous by Oxford philosopher Isaiah Berlin in his book on Leo Tolstoi 'The 
Hedgehog and the Fox' is still with us. 
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Last autumn Washington Post's editorial showed its ideological bias in such a way: 'When 
Vladimir Putin seeks to extend Russia's influence, he doesn't just want more people watching 
Russian movies or buying Russian MiGs. He wants to replicate among his neighbors the kind of 
one-party rule he has imposed on his own country'.1 7 7 This is a clear example of an ideologically 
driven approach to politics, an illustration of how Russia can be misperceived when facts and 
evidence are not taken account of. Today's Russia, or China for that matter, is not trying to turn 
liberal democracies into autocratic capitalists, or communists for that matter. Even the ideologi-
cally rigid Soviet Union could co-exist and cooperate, say, with capitalist and democratic Fin-
land benefiting, like Finland did, from such cooperation (though it is necessary to emphasize that 
this was rather an exception than a rule). Today Russia's foreign policy is quite pragmatic (some 
may say, too pragmatic when accusing it, for example, of selling arms to unsavoury regimes). In 
contrast to Mao's China and the former Soviet Union, today's China and Russia are not trying to 
export their values even when they support pro-Chinese or pro-Russian regimes abroad. What 
matters is not the ideology of such regimes but their attitude towards Russia (not what they are 
but what they do). Attempts to expand Russian values (and it is not clear even to most Russians 
what those values are and to what extent they differ from Western values) to other countries are 
not among the sins attributable to the Kremlin. Such misperceptions of Russia have their roots in 
recent history and do not take account of changing realities. I agree with Daniel Deudney and G. 
John Ikenberry who write that 'The democratic states should orient themselves to pragmatically 
address real and shared problems rather than focusing on ideological differences. Looking for 
alignments based on interests rather than regime type will further foreclose the unlikely coale-
scence of an antiliberal autocratic bloc'. 1 7 8 It is not only that all states cannot become, at least for 
some time, liberal democracies; there are common challenges that can be met only when diffe-
rent states closely cooperate; divisions of states into 'us' and 'them', into 'leagues of democra-
cies' and 'pariah states' are counterproductive. Take one of the current hot spots - Afghanistan. 
The International Herald Tribune put it well: 'Obama's Afghan challenge will be more 
diplomatic than military. To save Afghanistan, he will need to mold a strategic partnership that 
includes parties as disparate as Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and the Central Asian states. This 
will not be an easy task. But the alternative is endless war in Afghanistan'.179 The agreement on 
Afghanistan signed between America and Russia during the recent visit of President Obama to 
Moscow is a small but very significant step in the right direction. Without some kind of diplomatic 
1 7 7 ' 'The Freedom Challenge', Washington Post, Editorial, 24 November, 2008. 
1 7 8 ' D. Deudney and G. John Ikenbeny, 'The Myth of the Autocratic Revival. Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail', 
Foreign Affairs, January-February 2009. 
1 7 9 , 'Obama's Afghan Challenge: Build a New Alliance', International Herald Tribune, 6 January 2009. 
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and political alliance between Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and the Central Asian states, and 
probably other actors as well (even if ad hoc) NATO's Afghan mission will suffer the same fate 
the Soviet incursion of 1979-1988 or the nineteenth century British invasions of this country did. 
The request of the signatories of the letter that 'NATO must reconfirm its core function of 
collective defence even while we adapt to the new threats of the 21s t century' is an attempt to 
drag NATO back into the Cold War era while what is needed is to continue the transformation of 
the Alliance into a genuine collective security body that would deal more successfully with those 
new security threats that cannot be effectively tackled if NATO reconfirms its core Cold War 
role. A 21s t century NATO should be able to have strategic partnerships with countries that 
aren't necessarily its member-states or even with those that don't share its core values. 
The world has changed since Yalta. In contradistinction to the Cold War rivalry between 
ideologically motivated blocks, today states, with a few exceptions, are not threats to each 
others' security and development (I am not an idealist who believes in a harmonious and con-
flict-free world; however today's contradictions are usually not due to ideological incompatibi-
lities but they arise out of differences of concrete interests). On the contrary, only through co-
operation among all countries and first of all among most powerful states, can be resolved the 
most acute contemporary threats such as spread of WMD, terrorism, the current economic and 
financial crisis, ecological problems and drug trafficking. Moreover, in today's world great po-
wer cooperation, and even their strategic partnerships, cannot take place through a division of the 
world into respective spheres of influence, at the expense of and sacrificing interests of small 
countries. At the same time, it is undeniable that all states have spheres of interest and the bigger 
and more powerful a state the further such spheres extend. For the US not only Latin and Central 
America but also the Middle and Far East are regions where Washington considers its interests to 
be vital and where its influence has to run supreme. For Russia the Caucasus is certainly a region 
of such interests. And no state is content with having hostile governments in power in neighbou-
ring countries. However, recognizing if not legitimacy then at least inevitability of interests of all 
states, and especially of great powers, that transcend states' borders, doesn't mean that one 
should also agree that such powers have the right to special zones of influence. Robert Legvold 
in a recent article in Foreign Affairs writing about the American initiatives in Eastern Europe, 
observes that 'it is in the U.S. national interest - not least because it is in the interest of global 
stability - that as many states in the region as possible emerge as peaceful, stable, prosperous, 
and self-confident democratic societies. But it is also in the United States' long-term interest to 
avoid promoting this goal in ways that intentionally or unintentionally encourage these states to 
balance against Russia ...' (R. Legvold, 'The Russia File', Foreign Affairs, July-August 2009, 
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pp. 92-93). Even more damaging is the encouragement of such balancing for smaller Russian 
neighbours, some of whom during the Bush Administration competed in their anti-Russian rhe-
toric. Rivalry and mutual suspicions (not the close cooperation, which was non-existent) between 
Russia and the United States have also contributed to the instability and crises in Georgia and 
Ukraine. 
The nostalgia for Cold War clarity is seen in the attitude of the authors of the letter towards 'the 
thorniest issue' of the planned missile defence in Europe. They warn that 'abandoning the prog-
ram entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it' can undermine the credibility of the United 
States. Such support for the controversial anti-missile shield, which would allegedly protect the 
West from missiles from 'rogue' states and which would have nothing to do with Russia, in a let-
ter whose main (or even only) concern is about Washington 'resetting' the relations with Mos-
cow at the expense of Russia's small neighbours and which does not even mention any of those 
21s t century security threats, shows that at least in the minds of these former leaders and intellec-
tuals the missile shield was indeed all about Russia. Even if such a shield were not able to effec-
tively protect the West from Russian missiles (the radar in the Czech Republic would certainly 
be able to cover a big part of the Russian territory and where there are 10 interceptors there may 
well soon be 20 and so on), it would in any case work as a factor that hinders the development 
more cooperative relations between America and Russia, and between the West and Russia. 
Finally, though I would like to see Lech Walesa and other Poles visiting the United States 
without the need of queuing for visas (I hate that because I have had to queue for, say, Russian 
visas)and though I don't approve of the methods used by 'the French anti-globalization activist 
Jose Bove' (whose extreme views I don't share), who can use the visa free regime with the US, 
there is nothing incomprehensible in the fact that this French citizen does not need a visa if he 
wants to visit the US while Lech Walesa does. Visa regimes are waived for countries and not for 
individuals. Do the authors of the letter seriously believe that visa regimes should be dependent 
on the political views of individuals? Or maybe instead they would prefer a visa regime for 'the 
old Europe' where many may indeed 'too freely' voice their anti-American sentiments? Al-
though admittedly, within the last six months these sentiments are on the wane and there are less 
worries about American foreign policy trends in the world. 
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